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A MODEL FOR ALASKA:
DEREGULATION IN THE FAR
NORTH
This Note considers whether Alaska should follow the recent
state trend towards deregulation in the electrical market.  It first
examines the reasons behind the national trend towards
deregulaion.  Next it describes Alaska’s current electrical energy
market and regulatory scheme, and how it differs from the rest of
the states.  The Note then considers the regulatory schemes
recently passed by other states, focusing on California, Montana,
and Oregon.  It then contemplates what Alaska can learn from
the other states and concludes that if Alaska decides to
deregulate, it should do so cautiously, with due regard to Alaska’s
unique market conditions and the needs of residential customers.
I.  INTRODUCTION
Electrical deregulation is a hot topic.  Every state is currently
implementing or studying some form of restructuring in the retail
electrical market.1  Proponents of deregulation claim it lowers rates
and allows for innovation in a stagnant, regulated market.2
Opponents claim that deregulation primarily benefits large,
industrial customers, and that residential customers suffer in
deregulated markets.3  Opponents argue that electricity is not like
Copyright © 1999 by Inara K. Scott.  This Note is also available on the World
Wide Web at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/16ALRScott.
1. See infra note 87.
2. See Michael Even Stern & Margaret M. Mlynczak Stern, A Critical
Overview of the Economic and Environmental Consequences of the Deregulation
of the U.S. Electric Power Industry, 4 ENVTL. L. 79, 101-05 (1997) (concluding that
deregulation can bring benefits, but that the overriding goal of the restructured
industry will be profit maximization).
3. See Margaret Kriz, Doubts About Electricity Deregulation, NAT’L J., Mar.
6, 1999, at 621 (citing an Agriculture Department study indicating that the biggest
losers in deregulation may be rural cooperatives with high construction costs,
particularly if they lose access to low-cost preference power from federal power
marketing authorities).
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any other commodity; it is a necessity of life, requiring special
protection from the vagaries of competitive markets.4
While each state that implements deregulation must consider
its own unique situation, the state of Alaska stands alone in the
electrical market.  Alaska is not connected to the lower forty-eight
states by a transmission grid, and many rural areas of the state have
isolated transmission and generation facilities.5  A small customer
base limits opportunities for developing competitive markets and
economies of scale.6  Still, proponents of deregulation argue that
even in Alaska, competition will spark innovation and reduce
prices.7  They point to serious inefficiencies in the current market
— particularly the excess energy that goes to waste because there is
no market for it — to support their argument that Alaska residents
can benefit from competition.8
The Alaska Legislature is currently exploring options for
restructuring its retail electricity market and is considering
implementing a pilot program.9  Alaska should learn from the
legislative models presented by California, Montana, and Oregon.
If Alaska adopts deregulation legislation based on the Montana
model, it could easily find itself with monopoly conditions and
market share problems because of the lack of adequate
transmission facilities and limited number of suppliers.10  If it
adopts the California plan, residential customers could see little
benefit or higher rates in the long term, while industrial customers
would enjoy lower prices.11  Alaska’s best alternative is to adopt a
consumer-protective stance similar to that proposed in Oregon.
4. See George C. Loehr, Ten Myths About Electric Deregulation, 135 NO. 8
PUB. UTIL. FORT. 28 (Apr. 15, 1998) (arguing that deregulation will compromise
reliability).
5. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
6. See Karl R. Rabago et al., Final Report: Study of Electric Utility
Restructuring in Alaska (Apr. 1999) (last modified Jun. 1, 1999)
<http://www.state.ak.us/rca/r97010/CH2_Final_Report.htm> [hereinafter CH2M
Study].
7. See id. at 2.3.
8. See id.
9. See Karl R. Rabago & Tom Feiler, Recommendations to the Alaska State
Legislature and the Alaska Public Utilities Commission Regarding a Retail Pilot
Program (Mar. 1, 1999) (last modified Oct. 4, 1999) <http:www.state.ak.us/
rca/Electric.htm/> (recommending that Alaska implement technological and
regulatory reforms to prepare for the transition to competition, implement a
power pool or independent system operator (“ISO”), and develop a pilot program
according to goals for a deregulated environment).
10. See infra notes 106-113 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
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However, even a plan like Oregon’s should be adopted in stages in
order to prepare the market for competition.  Deregulation could
benefit Alaska, but regulators must proceed cautiously, with due
regard to Alaska’s unique market conditions and the needs of
residential customers.
II.  DEREGULATION:  SETTING THE SCENE
A. Forces Converge on Electric Utilities
Traditionally, electric utilities have been vertically integrated
companies12 with fully regulated rates.13  This tradition was built, at
least in part, on the assumption that the electrical market is a
natural monopoly.14  In the 1970’s, however, the traditional view of
12. The primary components of the electric energy market are generation,
transmission, and distribution. Transmission facilities take electricity at a high
voltage and send it to a load center, where it is converted to a lower voltage and
distributed to retail customers.  See LEONARD S. HYMAN, AMERICA’S ELECTRIC
UTILITIES: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 19 (5th ed. 1994).  A vertically integrated
utility contains all three components and creates one rate that includes the costs
and expenses for each component.  It is not altogether clear why utilities
developed this way.  Although the conventional wisdom centers around
economies of scale in generation and service of customers, other factors, like the
willingness of the utility companies to receive a lower rate of return than isolated
suppliers, might have been just as important.  See id. at 90-91.
13. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regulates the sale of
wholesale electrical energy and interstate transmission of electricity under the
Federal Power Act.  See Federal Power Act § 205, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1994).
State public utility commissions regulate retail distribution and sale of electricity
by private, investor-owned utilities in every state but Nebraska.  See PETER FOX-
PENNER, ELECTRIC UTILITY RESTRUCTURING: A GUIDE TO THE COMPETITIVE
ERA 98 (1997).  Municipal utilities and public utility districts operate a little
differently.  In 13 states, public utility commissions regulate these government-
owned bodies, which generally do not own transmission or generation facilities.
See id. at 103.  Elsewhere, they set their own rates.  The regulation of member-
owned cooperatives, or co-ops, also varies from state to state.  See PUBLIC
UTILITIES REPORTS, ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES: ON THE THRESHOLD OF A NEW
ERA 113-15 (1996).  In 25 of 46 states, state public utility commissions do not
regulate co-ops’ rates.  In 9 states, state commissions have no jurisdiction over co-
ops.  See id. at 113.  Each state’s public utility commission determines rates
differently, but they are bound by due process to ensure that utilities are able to
recover reasonable costs and earn a fair return.  See generally Walter Pond, The
Law Governing the Fixing of Public Utility Rates: A Response to Recent Judicial
and Academic Misconceptions, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 5-13 (1989).
14. See CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES:
THEORY & PRACTICE 4-9 (3d ed. 1993); see also HYMAN, supra note 12, at 4, 176-
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utilities began to change.  Customers, policy-makers, and
politicians speculated over the potential for competition to benefit
the electric energy market.  A combination of forces made this shift
in thinking possible.  First, forecasts of increased demand and a
threat of high prices for oil encouraged utilities to invest significant
amounts of money into developing new forms of electrical
generation, particularly nuclear power plants.15  A period of
inflation and high interest rates increased the cost of this capital
development, forced utilities to raise rates, and left customers
questioning the high prices and rate increases.16  As the cost of
nuclear development rose, so did concern over the environmental
impacts of these plants.17  Eventually, problems like the meltdown
at Three Mile Island called national attention to the danger of
nuclear power production.18
After investing large amounts of money into new generation,
utilities were dismayed to find that the forecasted demand did not
materialize.19  Instead, vertically integrated utilities had excess
capacity and enormous costs.  To make matters worse, inflation
increased the costs of operation for the nuclear plants while gas
77 (describing the various bases for the concept, including utilities’ provision of a
capital intensive, non-storable service, and the possibility that service would be
impaired by competitive pricing).  Some argue that utilities are no longer a natural
monopoly (if they ever were) because economies of scale no longer exist, and a
decentralized market for generation has developed.  See HYMAN, supra note 12, at
180.
15. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access, Non-
Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded
Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,543
(1996) [hereinafter Order 888]; see also HYMAN, supra note 12, at 14 (associating
rising costs and investment in nuclear power with the environmental movement).
The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC, oil embargo
furthered the fear of future oil prices.  See Jeffrey D. Watkiss & Douglas W.
Smith, The Energy Policy Act of 1992 — A Watershed for Competition in the
Wholesale Power Market, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 447, 452 (1993).  A further impetus
for building new generation was that prior to the 1970’s, costs for electric energy
consistently declined as the size of power plants increased.  See FOX-PENNER,
supra note 13, at 89.  Technological changes in the 1970’s brought an end to these
ever-increasing economies of scale, diminishing or even reversing the correlation
between economy and size.  See id. at 89-91.
16. See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 12.
17. See HYMAN, supra note 12, at 42-44.
18. See id. at 143.
19. See Order 888, supra note 15, at 21,543.  Between 1970 and 1985, average
residential electricity prices tripled.  See id. at 21,544.
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prices stayed low.20  New technology in generation, particularly gas-
fired turbines, allowed independent suppliers to produce lower cost
power than integrated utilities.21  Finally, a growing environmental
movement questioned the industry’s investment decisions, and
called attention to the potential for cost-efficient renewable
resources.22  As all of these forces came together in the early 1980’s,
public utility commissions grew impatient with utilities, and started
to limit or deny utilities the chance to recover their investments.23
Policy makers began looking for ways to encourage innovation in a
seemingly stagnant and flawed monopoly market.
B. Federal Intervention
The government’s first answer to the call for innovation was
the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (“PURPA”).24
PURPA created a new type of power producer called a qualifying
facility.25  A power producer could become a qualifying facility if it
met Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”)
20. See id. at 21,543.
21. See id. at 21,544.
22. See HYMAN, supra note 12, at 37-49.
23. Oregon provides an interesting example of this dynamic.  In 1978, Oregon
citizens passed an initiative prohibiting recovery by a utility of costs associated
with “any construction, building, installation or real or personal property not
presently used for providing utility service to the customer.”  OR. REV. STAT. §
757.355 (1998).  It appeared that this ordinance would preclude recovery of costs
from decommissioned nuclear power plants.  However, in 1993, the Oregon Public
Utility Commission ruled that the ordinance applied only to those plants that were
never in service.  See Portland General Electric Company, Order No. 913-117, 145
PUR 4th 113, 119 (Or. Pub. Util. Comm’n. 1993).  This ruling allowed Portland
General Electric to recover costs associated with the Trojan Nuclear Power Plant,
which began operation in 1975 and was permanently closed in 1993.  See id. at 115.
After numerous appeals, the Public Utility Commission’s decision was overturned.
See Citizens’ Util. Bd. v. Public Util. Comm’n, 962 P.2d 744, 746 (Or. Ct. App.
1998) (“We do not think that the word ‘presently’ . . . can plausibly be read as
pertaining only to utility property that is not yet in use, and we conclude that the
limitations of the statute apply to property that has ceased being used.”).  The
legislature immediately responded with a bill to override § 757.355 and allow for
recovery of property “retired from service.”  H.B. 3220, 70th Assembly, Reg. Sess.
(Or. 1999).  Although the bill was overwhelmingly approved by the legislature,
consumer groups are now seeking to overturn it by a public referendum on the
November 2000 ballot.  See Jeff Mapes, Consumer Groups Seek Vote on Payments
for Trojan Plant, OREGONIAN, July 16, 1999, at E6.
24. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92
Stat. 3117 [hereinafter PURPA].
25. See PURPA § 210 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (1994)).
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regulations as a small power producer or cogenerator.26  PURPA
forced utilities to buy power from qualifying facilities at “avoided
cost” — the cost each utility would have paid if it had produced the
energy itself or obtained it from an alternate source.27  With
PURPA, the government hoped to bring innovation to the industry
through regulated competition, and to encourage the development
of new suppliers.  PURPA brought a number of new players into
the electric industry — independent power producers and
marketers — and forced many to question the assumption that the
industry remained a natural monopoly.28  After PURPA, FERC
authorized new power producers and power marketers to sell
wholesale energy at market-based rates on a case-by-case basis if
the power producer could demonstrate that it did not have market
dominance.29  However, the inability of independent power
producers to access transmission systems owned by monopolistic
utilities limited their ability to compete in the wholesale market.30
Investor-owned utilities (“IOUs”) continued to generate the
majority of the power they sold, although they began to purchase
some wholesale power from qualifying facilities and other
independent power producers. 31
In 1992, the Energy Policy Act32 attempted to address the
difficulty faced by the independent power producers by giving
26. See id.
27. See id. (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (1994)).  The term “avoided cost”
is not in the statute, which refers to the “incremental cost to the utility of
alternative electric energy.”  Id. (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(c)).  As
interpreted by FERC, avoided cost pricing should “encourage efficiency and
innovation,” by providing for the growth of qualifying facilities, and should have
no adverse impact on utilities because the price for energy from a qualifying
facility is no more than what the utility would have to pay to generate the
electricity itself.  See Watkiss & Smith, supra note 15, at 453 n.23.
28. See Order 888, supra note 15, at 21,545.
29. See id. at 21,544.
30. See id. at 21,546; see also Watkiss & Smith, supra note 15, at 454-55
(providing examples of denials by utilities of transmission access for anti-
competitive reasons).  PURPA gave FERC the authority to order wheeling, but
that authority was limited to situations in which the order would “reasonably
preserve existing competitive relationships.”  PURPA § 203 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 824j(c)(1) (repealed 1992)); see also infra note 33.  Clearly, this provision was
antithetical to the use of wheeling authority to encourage competition.
31. In 1995, IOUs owned 68.8% of generation capacity for the United States,
and produced an average of 75% of the power they sold.  See FOX-PENNER, supra
note 13, at 119-20 tbl.5.1.  On the other hand, public utilities produce only about
17% of the electricity they sell.  See id.
32. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776.
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FERC the authority to order wholesale wheeling33 of power for any
utility, power marketing agency, or any other person generating
electricity for sale or for resale.34  The Energy Policy Act also
furthered the trend toward deregulation of electricity generation
by designating a new category of power producers called exempt
wholesale generators.35  These exempt wholesale generators were
excluded from the definition of electric utility companies,36 and
consequently were exempt from regulation under the Public Utility
Holding Company Act.37
C. FERC Takes Matters Into Its Own Hands
Although the Energy Policy Act gave FERC the authority to
order wholesale wheeling, independent power producers did not
rush to FERC to make wheeling requests.38  Seeking out wholesale
wheeling on a case-by-case basis actually gave the transmission
33. Wheeling is simply the practice of sending electricity through transmission
lines for another party. Without access to transmission lines, an independent
power producer has no means of transmitting electricity to its customers.  Since
they do not own transmission facilities themselves, independent power producers
must rely on a utility to provide transmission.  Utilities naturally have an interest
in not opening their transmission facilities to their competitors.  A wheeling order
forces the utility that owns the transmission lines to send the independent power
producer’s energy to the independent’s customers.
34. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 721(1) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824j
(1994)) (stating that “[a]ny electric utility, federal power marketing agency, or any
other person generating electric energy for sale for resale [sic] may apply to the
Commission for an order under this subsection requiring a transmitting utility to
provide transmission services (including any enlargement of transmission capacity
necessary to provide such services) to the applicant”).
35. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 711 (codified at 15 U.S.C § 79z-5a (1994)).
36. See id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 79z-5a(e)).
37. See Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (“PUHCA”), Pub. L. No.
105-220, 49 Stat. 838 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1994)).  PUHCA led to the
downfall of the large interstate holding companies that developed in the 1920’s
and 1930’s.  PUHCA prohibits the formation of any holding company twice
removed from its operating subsidiary, and requires approval from the Securities
and Exchange Commission for the purchase or sale of securities.  See Amy Abel &
Larry Parker, Electricity: The Road to Restructuring, CONG. RES. SERV., June 20,
1996, at 3-4 ( Issue Brief) (on file with author).  Exemption from PUHCA allows
exempt wholesale generators to own interests in qualifying facilities and
accumulate interstate holdings.  See Watkiss & Smith, supra note 15, at 467.
38. At the time FERC issued Order 888, it had issued orders requiring
wheeling in 12 cases.  See Order 888, supra note 15, at 21,547; see, e.g., City of
Bedford, 68 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,003 (1994), reh’g denied, 73 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,322 (1995);
Florida Mun. Power Agency v. Florida Power & Light Co., 67 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,167
(1994), order on reh’g, 74 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,006 (1996).
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utility an even greater advantage over the power producer simply
through the time delay caused by filing the request.39  In Order 888,
FERC attempted to remedy this situation by ordering all
transmission lines to be operated on a non-discriminatory, open-
access basis.40  Order 888 required utilities owning transmission to
provide open-access tariffs for their transmission services, and
required the utility owning the transmission to take service for
itself at the same tariff rates it charged other customers.41  To
eliminate problems of cost-shifting, FERC required utilities owning
transmission and generation facilities to functionally unbundle
those services.42  That is, utilities had to separate the costs and rates
for each component service so they would not be able to recover
costs from generation or retail distribution by setting higher rates
for transmission.
Although FERC did not order divestiture of generation or
transmission assets, it did provide principles for evaluating
proposals for an Independent System Operator (“ISO”),43 and
39. See Order 888, supra note 15, at 21,547.
40. See id. at 21,550.  As an agency rule, Order 888 could not expand FERC’s
legislative authority.  Instead, FERC interpreted its existing authority under the
Federal Power Act (“FPA”) as authorizing the imposition of mandatory wheeling
and open access tariff rates for transmission.  See id. at 21,560-63.  Section 206 of
the FPA authorizes FERC to “remedy undue discrimination.”  FERC held that
case-by-case wheeling orders under § 211 of the FPA actually furthered
discrimination, because of the time delays and the inherent inequalities in the
system.  Thus, FERC concluded that it has authority under § 206 to remedy the
discriminatory situation perpetuated by § 211.  See Order 888, supra note 15, at
21,562-63.
41. See Order 888, supra note 15, at 21,552.  FERC does allow utilities to favor
their own transmission needs when determining capacity.  Order 888 permits
utilities to reserve transmission service to serve native load growth.  See id. at
21,574.  However, FERC retains the authority to order the expansion of
transmission capacity.
42. See id. at 21,552.  Order 888 also requires all public utility transmission
suppliers to maintain a “code of conduct” that defines acceptable practices for the
interaction of generation and transmission employees and marketing functions.
See id.  FERC views this code of conduct as necessary to protect independent
generators and power marketers from discrimination and unfair market practices
in the absence of actual divestiture of generation assets by public utilities.  See id.
43. See id. at 21,595-97.  FERC lists eleven principles for assessing ISO
proposals: (1) the ISO’s management structure must be fair and non-
discriminatory; (2) the ISO and its employees should not have financial interest in
the ISO or market participants; (3) the ISO must provide open-access tariffs and
ensure non-discriminatory access to transmission; (4) the ISO must maintain
short-term reliability of the transmission grid; (5) the ISO should control the grid
within its region; (6) the ISO must identify and relieve transmission restraints and
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noted that it would be open to other mechanisms for ensuring non-
discriminatory access to transmission.44  An ISO is an independent,
typically non-profit entity that is not financially associated with a
utility.  Utilities relinquish control over the operation of their
transmission lines to the ISO, but retain the transmission assets.  In
theory, the ISO’s independence ensures that it manages
transmission lines fairly and without discrimination.  Some power
producers argue that in the absence of an ISO or similar entity,45
functional unbundling cannot eliminate discrimination in
transmission, because technical separation of functions does not
eliminate the utility’s overall profit-seeking motive, and
transmission-owning utilities can manipulate access to their
facilities to favor their own generators.46
In the realm of market-based pricing, Order 888 provided a
tiered structure.  In Kansas City Power & Light Company,47 FERC
approved market-based rates for new generation despite the
absence of a showing that the generator lacked market power.
Order 888 codified Kansas City Power & Light, creating a
rebuttable presumption that there is no market dominance by new
have some control over generation facilities; (7) the ISO must have incentives to
operate efficiently; (8) the ISO should promote efficient use of and investment in
all aspects of electrical energy sales; (9) the ISO must make information publicly
available via the Internet; (10) the ISO should coordinate with neighboring
regions; and (11) the ISO should establish an alternative dispute resolution
process.  See id.
44. See id. at 21,552.
45. Independent power producers and marketers also support the formation
of an independent for-profit transmission corporation, or transco.  See generally
Stephen Angle & George Cannon, Jr., Independent Transmission Companies: The
For-Profit Alternative in Competitive Electric Markets, 19 ENERGY L.J. 229 (1998).
Mary Hain, Director of Federal Regulatory Affairs with Enron Corporation,
argues that a transco would be more effective than an ISO because the transco
would have rate incentives to build new transmission, maximize system usage, and
eliminate so-called “pancake rates” where each ISO piles on a different access
charge.  She also argues that a transco can maintain operation control, manage
reliability and plan expansion better than an ISO.  See Mary C. Hain, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission and Energy Law, Mar. 2, 1999 (unpublished
presentation on file with the author).
46. See generally Petition for a Rulemaking on Electric Power Industry
Structure and Commercial Practices and Motion to Clarify or Reconsider Certain
Open-Access Commercial Practices; Nos. RM 95-8-000 & RM 98-5-000 (Mar. 25,
1998).  See also Hain, supra note 45.
47. 67 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,183 (1994) (concluding that improvements in market
entry for wholesale generators obviates the need for demonstration of a lack of
market dominance for new generation).
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generators.48  For the existing generation, Order 888 held that
FERC must consider evidence of market dominance on a case-by-
case basis before accepting market-based rates.49  Utilities with
transmission capacity were also required to file open access
transmission tariffs to demonstrate the absence of transmission
market power.50
Significantly, Order 888 provided for the recovery of stranded
costs, a key provision for many utilities.51  A stranded cost is a
“legitimate, prudent and verifiable cost” that a public utility incurs
with regard to a wholesale or retail customer.52  Utilities
accumulate stranded costs because prior to Order 888 planning
decisions were premised upon a stable customer base.  After Order
888, that stable customer base no longer exists.  A customer that
used to buy wholesale power from a utility might only require
transmission services from that utility once it is able to buy
electrical energy from another wholesale generator.  Similarly,
after Order 888, a retail customer of a utility might require
transmission and generation services only if it is able to contract
with an independent power producer.
Finally, FERC mandated the creation of an Open Access
Same-time Information System (“OASIS”), an Internet
information pool where utilities post information about their
transmission system and pricing.53  OASIS prevents utilities from
hoarding information about their transmission services, creating
“sweetheart” deals for certain utilities or power producers by
concealing accurate pricing information or not revealing the extent
of the utility’s capacity to handle additional load.
In Order 888, FERC opened interstate transmission lines to
wholesale access, but lacked jurisdiction to order open access to
48. See Order 888, supra note 15, at 21,553.  An intervenor could rebut this
presumption with evidence that a new generator would be able to exert market
power based on factors like its proximity to existing transmission.  See id.  FERC
also maintained its authority “to consider whether there is evidence of affiliate
abuse or reciprocal dealing,” providing intervenors with another avenue to
challenge the presumption of no unfair market power.  See id.
49. See id. at 21,555.
50. See id. at 21,553.
51. See id. at 21,629-30.
52. Order 888 places limits on the ability of a utility to recover costs for new
contracts that do not include an explicit provision for the recovery of stranded
costs.  See id. at 21,638.
53. See generally Open Access Same-Time Information System (Formerly
Real-Time Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737
(1996).
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retail distribution facilities.  Many expected states to complete the
deregulation process by ordering retail wheeling, but this has not
occurred.  Although many states have instituted some sort of pilot
program or actual deregulation legislation, many more are studying
the issues and waiting to see what happens in other states.54
III.  ALASKA TODAY
Alaska’s current electrical energy market and regulatory
scheme differ greatly from most of the states in the contiguous
United States.  These differences present particular challenges to
proponents of deregulation.
A. The Electrical Market in Alaska
The electrical grid in Alaska is as diverse and isolated as the
state’s population.  The entire state contains only about 250,000
customers for utilities.55  Many small generators that are not
connected to any state-wide grid operate independently to provide
service to individual villages.56  These isolated villages pay up to
five times as much for their electricity as residents of urban
Alaska.57  The only section of Alaska connected by a transmission
grid is the “Railbelt” area, which runs from Fairbanks in the north
to Valdez in the southeast and Homer in the southwest, and
produces approximately 86% of the electricity generated in
Alaska.58  The Alaska Energy Authority owns the Intertie, which is
an interconnection permitting passage of current between two or
54. Twenty-one states currently have some sort of restructuring legislation in
place.  See infra note 87.  Several bills have been presented in Congress to require
states to adopt direct access principles.  See How Federal Bills Address Electric
Utility Restructuring Issues (May 1998) (visited Oct. 22, 1999)
<http://www.naruc.org/Congressional/restructuringmatrix.htm> (providing an
overview of nine federal restructuring bills and draft proposals).
55. See Dan Joling, Utility Redesign Gets Look, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS,
Jan. 19, 1999, at F1.
56. See generally Alaska, Energy Information Administration, Status of State
Electric Utility Deregulation Activity (last modified Oct. 1, 1999)
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/st_profiles/alaska/ak.html> [hereinafter
EIA-Alaska].
57. See Dan Joling, Electric Plan Aids Villages; Urban Areas Would Boost
Bush Utilities, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 15, 1999, at D1.
58. See Black & Veatch, Power Pooling/Central Dispatch Planning Study 2-1,
U-97-140, Alaska Public Utility Commission (Oct. 1998) (visited Oct. 22, 1999)
<http://www.state.ak.us/apuc/u97140/> [hereinafter Black & Veatch Study].  Non-
Railbelt utilities accounted for 23% of sales of electricity and 33% of revenues in
Alaska in 1997.  See CH2M Study, supra note 6, at 3.28-3.29.
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more electric utility systems.  The Alaskan Intertie currently
connects the northern and southern Railbelt utilities.59  A new
Northern Intertie, connecting Fairbanks and Healy, is due to be
completed in late 1999.60  A Southern Intertie has been proposed to
run from the Kenai area to Anchorage.61
Generation, transmission, and distribution in the Railbelt are
provided by Alaska Electric Generation and Transmission, a
cooperative formed by Homer Electric Association and Matanuska
Electric Association; Anchorage, Municipal Light & Power
(“ML&P”); Chugach Electric Association (“Chugach”); and
Golden Valley Electric Association (“Golden Valley”).62  The
Seward Electric System also operates in the Railbelt, but does not
own any generation facilities.  All of these utilities own a partial
share in Bradley Lake, a hydroelectric plant owned by the Alaska
Energy Authority.63  The Railbelt utilities participate in a loose
power pool.64  A recent study of transmission management found
that both an ISO and a tight power pool would provide some cost
benefits to the area.65  However, the expenses involved in starting
up such entities outweigh those benefits for the first ten years of
operation.66
Investor-owned utilities do not predominate in Alaska.  In
1996, IOUs accounted for only 8.4% of retail sales, while co-ops
accounted for 60.7%.67  Golden Valley and Chugach are both co-
59. See Black & Veatch Study, supra note 58, at 2-5.
60. See id. at 5-15.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 2-1 to 2-5.  Golden Valley recently purchased Fairbanks
Municipal Utility System, giving it control over the northern section of the
Railbelt.  See Golden Valley Annual Report (visited Oct. 22, 1999)
<http://www.gvea.com/about/annrep.htm>.
63. See Black & Veatch Study, supra note 58, at 2-5 tbl.2-1.
64. See id. at 2-6.  The power pool that currently exists in the Railbelt consists
of loose, bilateral agreements between and among generators and distribution
utilities.  See id.  Under this system, utilities maintain control over their
distribution and transmission systems, but are able to save money by contractually
aggregating individual loads to better utilize both generation and transmission
resources.  See id. at 7-2.  In a “tight power pool,” as described in the Black and
Veatch Study, utilities pool all generated power, with distribution controlled by an
independent system operator or a representative of one of the members of the
system.  See id. at 6-5.
65. See id. at 6-7.  A tight power pool could provide approximately 2-4%
savings over the current loose power pool.  See id.
66. See id.
67. See CH2M study, supra note 6, at 1.14 tbl.1-10.
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ops.68  Alaska Electric Light and Power, which operates around the
state capital of Juneau, is the only IOU among the five biggest
utilities in the state.69  At one time, a federal power administration,
the Alaska Power Administration, operated two hydroelectric
plants in Alaska, but in 1995 the Congress terminated the Alaska
Power Administration and sold its assets.70
Alaska has no nuclear generation, and its few coal-fired plants
account for only 4.6% of generation, in stark contrast to the
national average of 71.9%.71  Alaska’s reliance on gas and
hydroelectric sources of generation accounts for it having some of
the lowest emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and carbon
dioxide in the nation.72
B. The Current Regulatory Scheme
Like most states, Alaska has a public utility commission, the
newly named Regulatory Commission of Alaska (“RCA”), which
oversees rates, facilities, practices, and services offered by utilities.73
Every public utility, including municipalities and co-ops,74 must file
a tariff with the RCA designating its rates, rules, and regulations.75
However, if annual gross revenues of the utility amount to less than
$50,000, the utility is automatically exempted from regulation, and
if revenues amount to $500,000 or less, customers of the utility can
petition to have the utility deregulated.76  In either case, an election
of at least 15% of eligible members or subscribers determines if the
utility should be deregulated.77  The regulated utility must set rates
68. See EIA-Alaska, supra note 56.
69. See id.
70. See Lori A. Burkhart, et al., 136 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 14, 17 (Oct. 15, 1998).
The Alaska Power Administration was terminated by an act of Congress in 1995,
and the first sale of the assets was completed on August 18, 1998.  See id.
71. See CH2M study, supra note 6, at 1.09 tbl.1.6.
72. See EIA-Alaska, supra note 56.
73. See ALASKA STAT. § 42.05.141 (LEXIS 1998).  The Alaska Public Utility
Commission (“APUC”) was dissolved in July 1999, and replaced with a newly
named Regulatory Commission of Alaska, which assumed its responsibilities.
However, the relevant statutes still refer to the APUC.  See id.
74. Public utilities are defined as “every corporation whether public,
cooperative, or otherwise, company, individual, or association of individuals . . .
that owns, operates, manages, or controls any plant, pipeline, or system for (A)
furnishing, by generation, transmission, or distribution, electrical service to the
public for compensation . . . .”  Id. § 42.05.990(4).
75. See id. § 42.05.361(a).
76. See id. §§ 42.05.711(e)(f), 42.05.712.
77. See id. § 42.05.712(b).  In 1989, three utilities (I-N-N Electric Cooperative,
Levelock Electric Cooperative, and Coffman Cove Utilities Association) voted in
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that are “just and reasonable.”78  If the RCA determines that rates
are unduly discriminatory, unjust or unreasonable, it determines
new rates for the utility.79  A public utility may not operate until it
has received a certificate of public necessity.80  If two or more
public utilities offer identical services and the competition between
them is “not in the public interest,”81 the RCA shall act to eliminate
the competition.82
Since 1993, electrical costs of rural Alaska have been
subsidized by the Power Cost Equalization Fund.83  The RCA
certifies an applicant utility for participation in the program, and
determines the extent of support that the participating utility’s
customers will receive.84  This Fund has been drained from its
original endowment of $67 million to a current balance of $3
million.85  The future of the program looks bleak.  Legislators have
proposed instituting a universal system charge to electric customers
to continue the subsidies.86
IV.  STATE DEREGULATION: FROM CALIFORNIA TO OREGON
A. General Overview of State Deregulation
Twenty-one states have adopted legislation that restructures
the sale of electric energy and allows retail customers to have direct
access to energy service providers.87  The variations in the
favor of being deregulated, while the Kodiak Electric Association members voted
against the utility being deregulated.  See Utility Deregulation Election Results
(visited Oct. 4, 1999)
<http://www.state.ak.us/apuc/annualreports/98annl_rpt/V2P34.htm >.
78. ALASKA STAT. § 42.05.381 (LEXIS 1998).
79. See id. § 42.05.431(a).  The RCU must make a simplified rate filing
procedure available to co-ops.  See id. § 42.05.381(e).
80. See id. § 42.05.221(a).
81. Id. § 42.05.221(d).
82. See id.
83. See Joling, supra note 57, at D1.
84. See About the RCA (last modified Aug.,. 3, 1999)
<http://www.state.ak.us/rca/about.htm>.
85. See Joling, supra note 57, at D1.
86. See id.
87. As of October 1, 1999, the following states had enacted some form of
restructuring legislation: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Texas, and Virginia.  See Status of State Electric Utility Deregulation Activity as of
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legislation from state to state are primarily a matter of degree.
Deregulation plans generally recognize the right of utilities to
recover stranded costs,88 but differ on the length of time over which
those costs are recovered, or the degree of discretion the public
utility commission has to limit or deny recovery.89  Most legislation
provides for a universal system charge to fund public service
functions such as the development of renewable resources or
subsidization of power for low-income residents.90  To protect
consumers and ensure a measure of reliability, deregulated states
typically create a certification process for suppliers before allowing
them to enter the competitive market.91  Finally, state deregulation
plans typically include a default service provider for those
customers who do not choose a supplier on their own.92
Oct. 1, 1999 (last modified Oct. 1, 1999) <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/
chg_str/regmap.html>.
88. For a definition of stranded costs, see supra note 52 and accompanying
text.  The bulk of deregulation stranded costs result from the avoided cost
contracts with qualifying facilities, which were imposed by PURPA.  These
contracts, estimated on a long-term basis, proved in many cases to be wildly over-
estimated.  See FOX-PENNER, supra note 13, at 138.  One New York utility
estimates that its qualifying facility contracts are approximately $3.3 billion above
market rates.  See id.
89. California, for example, limits the recovery period to four years.  See CAL.
PUB. UTIL. CODE § 367 (West Supp. 1999).  Rhode Island spreads recovery of
stranded costs over 12 years.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-1-27.4 (1997).  The Oregon
plan does not limit recovery to a specified term of years, and leaves the Public
Utility Commission with the discretion to limit recovery of costs where recovery is
not “in the public interest.”  S.B. 1149 § 8(2), 70th Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Or.
1999); see also infra notes 114-131 and accompanying text.
90. In Montana, the Universal System Benefits Program “ensure[s] continued
funding of and new expenditures for energy conservation, renewable resource
projects and applications, and low-income energy assistance.”  MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 69-8-402(1) (1999).  Utilities contribute 2.4% of their annual retail sales revenue
to the fund.  See id. § 69-8-402(2).  Maine, on the other hand, requires each
competitive energy provider to produce 30% of its supply from renewable
resources.  See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 35A § 3210 (3) (West 1998).
91. See, e.g., 66 PA. CONS. STAT § 2809 (1999).
92. Massachusetts offers a default rate and a standard offer rate, along with
direct access.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 164, § 1B (Supp. 1999).  The standard rate
provides customers with a 10% rate reduction, but is available only until 2004.  See
id.  The default rate is regulated by the Massachusetts Department of
Telecommunications and Energy, and may not exceed the average market price
for electricity in New England.  See id.  In Rhode Island, utilities must provide a
standard offer until the year 2009 for customers who have not chosen an alternate
supplier.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-1-27.3 (1997).  The utility is also the “provider
of last resort” for customers who are not eligible for the standard rate.  See id.
SCOTT.FMT.FINAL 11/09/99  9:06 AM
344 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [16:2
B. California Residential Customers Ask, “What About Us?”
1. Deregulation in California.  Retail customers in California
got their first taste of direct access in March 1998.93  Deregulation
seemed a natural fit for California, which had the tenth most
expensive electricity in the country, and the largest non-utility
generation capacity in 1996.94  The California deregulation
legislation has some standard provisions, as well as some unique
ones.  Utilities can recover stranded costs, but they are placed on
an aggressive recovery schedule that caps costs after the year
2001,95 and limits recovery for certain costs of coal-fired plants.96
Small commercial and residential customers received an immediate
rate reduction of ten percent, and they must continue to receive
this ten percent reduction through 2002.97  Although California did
not require divestiture of generation, utilities that wish to keep
generation facilities must demonstrate to the California Public
Utility Commission that doing so would be in the public interest
Montana allows utilities to recommend a method for assigning customers to a
supplier who do not choose for themselves.  See MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-8-203
(1999).
93. See Marla Dickerson, A New Era in Electricity; Q & A Deregulation: What
Happens Now?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1998, at D1.  Legislation called for direct
access by January 1998, but technical problems with the ISO and Power Exchange
delayed the opening of the market.  See Final Opinion (Decision 97-12-131)
Modifying Various Decisions Issued 12-30-97, Public Utilities Commission of the
State of California, Dec. 30, 1997 (last modified June 8, 1999) <http://
www.cpuc.ca.gov/electric_restructuring/decisions/d9712131/d9712131.htm>.
94. See Energy Information Administration, Status of State Electric Utility
Deregulation Activity, California (last modified Oct. 1, 1999)
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/st_profiles/california/ca.html>
[hereinafter EIA-California].
95. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 367 (West 1999).  The costs recoverable
include power purchase contracts with qualifying facilities, capital and certain
administrative costs for generation, including nuclear, and employee-related
transition costs.  See id.
96. Utilities are not permitted to recover “forward going costs” for fossil fuel
plants, including maintenance and administration, with exceptions for
circumstances in which market-based rates are not procurable in specific areas.
See id. § 367(c).
97. See id. § 368(a).  If the utility pays off its stranded costs before 2002, it may
alter these rate levels.  San Diego Gas & Electric paid off its costs two and a half
years early, and responded by requesting an additional 10% rate reduction for its
customers.  See Nancy Rivera, Utilities SDG&E Seeking 10% Rate Cut Thanks to
Deregulation Payoff, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1999, at C1.
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and would not result in unfair market advantage.98  Unlike most
states, California implemented both an ISO and a Power
Exchange.  The Power Exchange functions as a competitive
auction into which utilities bid and purchase wholesale power.99
2. Who Profits From Deregulation in California?  No one
doubts that retail deregulation primarily benefits large industrial
users.  Although deregulation brought residential customers in
California an immediate ten percent reduction on their electrical
bill, consumer groups argue that this “discount” will ultimately be
repaid by consumers because electricity rates will be increased to
pay for the bonds that financed the initial discount.100  Large
industrial users, on the other hand, receive genuine discounts (up
to twenty-five percent) on their purchases as a result of the
competition for industrial customers.101  The disparity in rates has
led to a disparity in the exercise of choice; only one percent of all
electric customers switched providers in the first seven months of
deregulation, but 24.9% of large industrial users switched.102
Independent energy providers complain that high stranded cost
charges103 make it impossible for them to compete in the market.
Retail prices of wholesale electricity are now below wholesale
costs, causing many providers to drop out of the market.104  Perhaps
the most chilling news for residential customers is that many
companies and public agencies now form long-term strategic
alliances with energy service providers because the market has
become too complex for them to navigate efficiently on their
own.105  Unless residential customers are part of a municipality or
98. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 377 (West 1999).
99. See Jim Rossi, The Common Law “Duty to Serve” and Protection of
Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 1233, 1283-84 (1998).
100. See Dickerson, supra note 93, at D1.
101. See id.
102. See Nancy Rivera, Electricity Newcomers in Old-Power Struggle Energy:
Amid Signs that Deregulation Is Catching on with Customers, Fledgling Providers
Complain About Utilities’ “Monopoly Mentality,” L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1998, at
C1.
103. Stranded costs now represent 25%-30% of the average utility bill.  See
Dickerson, supra note 93, at D1.
104. See With Retail Prices Lower Than Wholesale, California ESPs Say They
Cannot Compete, Energy Services & Telecom Report, Nov. 19, 1998, available in
1998 WL 10029096.  Of the 300 ESPs that originally registered to do business in
California, less than 10 remain.  See id.
105. See id.
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other strategically allied group, it is difficult to see how they will be
able to choose an energy supplier effectively.
C. Montana Leaves Retail Customers in the Cold
Montana passed deregulation legislation in 1997.106  The
statutes are broad and straightforward because they allow utilities a
great deal of discretion in determining the path of restructuring.
For example, rather than requiring utilities to serve as default
energy providers, the Montana legislation requests utilities to
suggest a method for determining the default supplier, or provider
of last resort.107  Utilities must maintain existing customer service
requirements, as well as standards for safety and reliability, but the
statute does not dictate what those standards should be.108
Although utilities must functionally unbundle transmission,
distribution and generation services, the Montana Public Utility
Commission is prohibited from requiring or prohibiting divestiture
of generation assets.109
The results of this discretion have been mixed.  Before
deregulation, Montana citizens enjoyed access to low-cost
hydropower.110  This may no longer be the case.  Within months of
deregulation, the Montana Power Company sold its generating
facilities, five coal plants, and thirteen hydroelectric plants to an
out-of-state company; thus Montana citizens are no longer
guaranteed access to this low-cost electricity.111  In addition, there is
growing concern regarding the exploitation of water rights that
accompanied the hydropower assets.112  However, some cities in
106. See S.B. 390, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (Mont. 1997).
107. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-8-203(2) (1999).
108. See id. § 69-8-401.
109. See id. § 69-8-204(1-2).
110. See Energy Information Administration, State Electricity Profiles: Montana
(last modified Sept. 1999) <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/st_profiles/
montana/mt.html>.
111. See Tom Kenworthy, In Montana, A Volt Out of the Blue; After State
Deregulated, Utility Decides It Wants to Generate Different Business, WASH. POST,
Mar. 4, 1998, at A2.  Montana citizens may lose access to low-cost federal
hydropower, because the federal Bonneville Power Administration says the co-op
the Montana Legislature created to replace Montana Power is not a public utility
and therefore may not buy from the 29 Columbia River Dams the agency
operates.  See Rob Eure, Montana Co-op Fights to Buy Federal Power, WALL ST.
J., July 21, 1999, at NW1.
112. For example, the Avista corporation now holds water rights that could
supersede the drinking water system for the city of Missoula.  See Betsy Z.
Russell, Power Play Could Leave Some Dry; N. Idaho Vulnerable to Avista’s Vast
Water Rights, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, Feb. 28, 1999, at A1.
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Montana are now purchasing power from alternate suppliers and
achieving a limited reduction in rates.113
D. Imposing Residential Protection: The Oregon Plan
Newly passed legislation in Oregon, known as the Oregon
plan, resembles bills offered in other states.114  The Oregon plan
establishes a “public purpose charge” requiring three percent of
total revenues from retail electrical sales to be used for renewable
resources, conservation and market transformation, and low-
income weatherization.115  Electric companies must functionally
unbundle their generation, transmission, and distribution
services,116 and the Oregon Public Utility Commission is authorized
to provide incentives for divestiture of generation assets.117
Stranded costs may be recovered through a transition charge,
although the Public Utility Commission may limit that recovery
based on the public interest.118  Retail customers are permitted to
aggregate their loads,119 and all retail customers, except for
residential customers, must be given direct access to wholesale
suppliers by the year 2001.120
The key distinction of the Oregon plan is that it excludes retail
residential customers from direct access.  Instead of direct access,
the plan requires that utilities give all residential and small
commercial customers of IOUs a portfolio of rate options by the
113. Twenty-three cities have entered into contracts with Energy West
Resources, and are expecting to save about 3% over the next 15 months.  See
Montana Towns Saving in Deregulated Market, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRE,
11:27:00, Apr. 16, 1999, available in WL, Montana News.
114. See S.B. 1149, 70th Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999); Jeff Mapes, Senate
Votes to Open Energy Market, OREGONIAN, July 10, 1999, at B1; see also Fred
Leeson, Power’s Free-Market Crawl, OREGONIAN, Sept. 5, 1999, at B1 (describing
growing frustration by industrial customers with Oregon’s cautious approach to
deregulation).
115. See S.B. 1149, 70th Assembly, Reg. Sess. § 3(1)-(2)(a) (Or. 1999).  The
funds gathered by the public purpose charge are divided as follows: 63% to
conservation and market transformation, 19% for new renewable resources, and
13% for low-income weatherization.  See id. § 3(b)(A)-(C).
116. See id. § 5.
117. See id. § 6(2).
118. See id. § 8(2).  The transition charge must “reasonably balance the
interests of retail electricity consumers and utility investors.  The commission may
determine that full or partial recovery of the costs of uneconomic utility
investments . . . is in the public interest.”  Id.
119. See id. § 9.
120. See id. § 2(1).
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year 2001.121  In essence, the portfolio plan forces utilities to make
generation choices on behalf of residential and small commercial
customers.  The utility would contract with energy service
providers or power producers and then create different rate
options for its customers.  These rate options would have to include
a market-based rate, a rate reflecting new renewable energy
resources, and a cost-of-service rate.122  The Public Utility
Commission would continue to regulate these rate options to
ensure that they accurately reflect costs and risks.123  Municipals
and co-ops would have the option of offering direct or portfolio
access or any other form of access that the governing board of the
entity determines to be in its best interest.124  However, if a
municipal or co-op sought to serve retail customers of another
electric company, it would have to provide reciprocal access to its
customers by that utility.125
The cost-of-service rate requirement is similar to the provision
in most state plans that the utility remain the default provider, or
provider of last resort, for customers who do not or cannot make a
choice of suppliers.126  States generally take one of two approaches
in provider-of-last-resort circumstances.  Under the first approach,
the state requires the utility to take bids from other suppliers to
provide for these customers.  In the other, the utility can provide
some or all of the power requirements from its own generation
facilities.127  Unless states mandate divestiture or open bids for
generation, investor-owned utilities will supply their own wholesale
power and will be regulated in essentially the same way they were
before deregulation.  Even if the utility does not supply the
121. See id. § 4.
122. See id. § 4(2). The cost-of-service rate represents the regulated rate
allowed by the Oregon Public Utility Commission.  For a discussion of public
utility ratemaking, see Pond, supra note 13, at 5-13.
123. See S.B. 1149, 70th Assembly, Reg. Sess. § 4 (Or. 1999).
124. See id. § 24.
125. See id. §§ 11, 23.
126. See FOX-PENNER, supra note 13, at 277.
127. Pennsylvania requires utilities to purchase wholesale electricity at
“prevailing market prices” for customers whose supplier does not provide
contracted services or for customers who do not choose a supplier.  See 66 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 2807(e)(3) (1999).  In Rhode Island, the utility must solicit bids in
the unregulated market for the last resort power supply.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-
1-27.3(f) (1997).  Maine’s Public Utility Commission regulates the standard-offer
service rate, which is chosen by a competitive bidding procedure.  However,
utilities in Maine must divest all generation assets by March 2000.  See Maine
Public Utilities Commission, Summary — Electrical Utility Restructuring in Maine
(last modified Oct. 5, 1999) <http://www.state.me.us/mpuc/ersumm.htm>.
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wholesale power, the state public utility commission generally
oversees the default rate offered by the utility to ensure that
wholesale power is purchased at reasonable rates or market rates
as required by the legislation.128  Fluctuations in this rate will be
determined by the cost of wholesale energy to the utility, which
states cannot directly regulate.
Unlike other default provider provisions, however, the cost-of-
service rate in the Oregon plan creates substantial protection for
residential customers.  Utilities can be required by the Public
Utility Commission to purchase power from the Bonneville Power
Administration, which markets low-cost hydropower generated at
federal projects in the Columbia River Basin.129  The Public Utility
Commission also has the authority to order a utility to keep
generation assets when necessary to provide customers access to
low-cost power.130  Putting these pieces together, the Public Utility
Commission can essentially mandate a “just and reasonable” cost-
of-service rate calculated with the presumption that utilities will
use their low-cost wholesale power to supply the needs of
residential customers.  This provision ensures that utilities cannot
attract industrial customers with low-cost power and leave less
attractive residential customers with the remaining higher cost
power.  The Oregon Public Utility Commission has already
rejected an application by a utility to sell hydroelectric facilities,
because it determined that those assets should be maintained to
provide low-cost power for residential customers.131
128. See, e.g., 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2807(e)(3) (1999) (requiring the Public
Utility Commission oversight to ensure that utilities buy power at “prevailing
market prices”).
129. See S.B. 1149, 70th Assembly, Reg. Sess. § 19 (Or. 1999).  The Bonneville
Power Administration markets hydropower produced at federal projects in the
Columbia River Basin.  See generally, Michael C. Blumm, The Northwest’s
Hydroelectric Heritage: Prologue to the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning
and Conservation Act, 58 WASH. L. REV. 175, 201 (1983).  The Bonneville Power
Administration has a statutory duty to give preference to public power needs
when allocating its resources.  Advocates of S.B. 1149 are unsure of the way the
public power preference will disrupt their scheme for mandatory purchases from
Bonneville Power Administration; thus a provision of the bill indicates that key
provisions will take effect only if they do not compromise public access to
Bonneville power.  See S.B. 1149, 70th Assembly, Reg. Sess. § 18(1) (Or. 1999).
130. See id. § 6(2).
131. Portland General Electric petitioned the Oregon Public Utility
Commission for permission to divest its generation facilities.  See Portland
General Electric Company, Order No. 913-117, 145 PUR 4th 113, 119 (Or. Pub.
Util. Comm’n. 1993) (rejecting Customer Choice Plan).  The Commission
approved the sale of non-hydroelectric generation but denied Portland General
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V.  A MODEL FOR ALASKA
A. Should Alaska Deregulate?
Rural Alaskans are extremely concerned by deregulation
proposals because they recognize that they are unlikely to be
attractive customers in a competitive wholesale market.132  Some
argue that deregulation has little to offer any retail customers in
Alaska, because the high prices are a result of transmission costs
rather than wholesale power costs.133  Furthermore, because of the
limited number of market players and limited transmission service,
the Alaskan power market cannot afford mistakes and
experimentation.134  Others in the industry contend that Alaska will
not be ready for deregulation until the transmission system is
seriously improved; in particular, deregulation should await
completion of the Northern and Southern Intertie.135  However, a
recent study of deregulation in Alaska concludes that deregulation,
if implemented cautiously, could produce “measurable benefits”
for Alaskans.136  The study identifies heavy generation
concentration, lack of public awareness, inadequate dispatch
coordination, and significant stranded costs as the key areas of
inefficiency that must be resolved to accommodate a move to
competition.137  An examination of all the various perspectives
leads to one clear conclusion: Alaska cannot plunge into
deregulation without serious consideration of the unique service
problems it faces.
B. If It Deregulates, Alaska Should Look to Oregon for Guidance
At first glance, it may seem that any proposed legislation that
would work for Oregon would be inapplicable to Alaska.  Oregon
Electric permission to sell the hydroelectric facilities unless it could demonstrate
that residential customers would not be hurt by the sale.  See id. at Part XIII.A(4).
132. See CH2M Study, supra note 6, at 3.1; see also Tim Bradner, Deregulation
Divides Electric Utilities, ALASKA J. COM., Mar. 1, 1999, at 10.
133. See Bradner, supra note 132 at 11.  The wholesale power contributes only
25% of the costs of electricity in Alaska.  See id.
134. See id.  Chugach’s Beluga power plant generates close to half of the power
for the state of Alaska.  See Doug O’Harra, Heart of the Dynamo: When the
Beluga Power Plant Goes Down, Half of Alaska Loses Its Lights, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 28, 1996, at G6.  If Beluga experiences problems with even one
of its generators, the entire Railbelt can end up in a blackout.  See id.
135. See Interview with Kirk Gibson, Partner, Ater Wynne, LLP in Portland,
Or. (Apr. 30, 1999) (on file with author).
136. CH2M Study, supra note 6, at 2.3.
137. See id.
SCOTT.FMT.FINAL 11/09/99  9:06 AM
1999] ELECTRICAL DEREGULATION IN ALASKA 351
has some of the lowest cost power in the United States, while
Alaska has some of the highest.  From a consumer’s point of view,
the Oregon Legislature should be focusing on how to encourage
competition while maintaining access by retail consumers to certain
low-cost power producers.  Legislation implemented in California
or Pennsylvania, which was directly motivated by a desire to
decrease prices, to encourage competition, and to open access to
new suppliers appears more directly applicable to Alaska.
However, unlike Alaska, most states with high cost power like
California and Pennsylvania have access to well-developed
networks for transmission and numerous power producers waiting
in the wings to serve a deregulated market.138  Alaska does not have
transmission access to states in the lower forty-eight states, or even
a comprehensive grid within the state.  It also lacks a plethora of
independent suppliers waiting to serve customers.  Indeed, only
two major utilities, Chugach and ML&P, currently have significant
excess power to sell to customers. 139  Open markets simply cannot
give Alaskan customers access to a variety of energy service
providers.  Consequently, the market for residential customers will
lack genuine competition.  Furthermore, unlike New England or
the Midwest, Alaska does not have a dire need to develop
resources to generate more power.140  Instead, Alaska’s current
generation resources are expected to meet demand for the next
twenty years.141  It will be difficult for any generator to challenge
ML&P and Chugach because the limited number of consumers
impedes development of economies of scale.142  Thus, like Oregon,
Alaska must focus on developing competition within a relatively
stable market of suppliers.
138. See id. at 2.1-2.2.
139. See Black & Veatch Study, supra note 58, at 5-2, 5-9.  Golden Valley will
have a capacity deficiency before the year 2016.  See id. at 5-2, 5-7.
140. Analysts argue that New England and the Midwest are in serious need of
new, efficient generation.  See Charles W. Thurston, Merchant Power: Promise or
Reality, 137 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 15, 17 (Jan. 1, 1999).  Price spikes in the Midwest in
the summer of 1998 were exacerbated by a thin peak reserve margin of
generation, plants out of operation for regular maintenance, the alleged default of
a small supplier, and bad weather.  See Robert J. Michaels & Jerry Ellig, Price
Spike Redux: A Market Emerged, Remarkably Rational, 137 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 40,
41-42 (Feb. 1, 1999).
141. See CH2M Study, supra note 6, at 1.2 to 1.3.
142. See id. at 2.5.  The excess capacity and market share already held by
Chugach leaves many people wondering if other independent power producers
could compete effectively in the wholesale market.  See Dan Joling, Utility
Redesign Gets Look, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 19, 1999, at F1.
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Although their motives are not the same, Alaska and Oregon
both have important reasons for asking their current utilities to
represent them in choosing wholesale suppliers and asking those
utilities to continue offering a cost-of-service rate.  First, both
states have strong reasons to maintain aggregated networks of
consumers.  In Oregon, current access to low-cost power means
that unless consumers are aggregated by the portfolio system, they
are unlikely to command enough market power to achieve or
exceed their current low prices.  In Alaska, the small number of
consumers mandates that they remain aggregated in order to have
any amount of market share.  The vast majority of customers in
Alaska already belong to a cooperative or are served by a
municipal utility that acts on their behalf to purchase or supply
low-cost power.  These utilities will lose market share if their
customer base is disaggregated.  Second, in Oregon, consumers
want to be served by utilities that own low-cost generation assets;
forcing the utility to offer a cost-of-service rate and to hold
generation assets guarantees access to the low-cost power.  In
Alaska, small numbers leave residential customers particularly
vulnerable to being left behind if utilities with excess capacity
lower wholesale rates to attract large industrial customers and raise
residential rates to accommodate the industrial rate shift.143  A cost-
of-service rate would enable the RCA to mandate that utilities with
generation resources offer reasonable wholesale prices to
residential customers.
C. How Alaska Can Learn From California and Montana
Alaska can learn some valuable lessons from the experiences
of Montana and California in this area.  California’s residential
customers have shown little interest in choosing new energy
suppliers.  Although residential and small commercial customers
are seeing an immediate rate reduction, the price of that reduction
may simply be passed back to the customers when financing bonds
are repaid.  Independent energy suppliers have made few inroads
in the market because of high stranded costs compressed into a
short time period.  Alaska will have to offer residential customers
something more than a short-term rate reduction, financed at their
expense, to encourage them to learn about and operate in the
wholesale electric energy market.
143. See Stephen Conn, Utility “Cherry Picking” is Pits for Residential Users
Compass, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 22, 1999, at E12 (arguing that cherry
picking will raise residential rates and that any pilot program should provide
customers with accurate data of future electrical costs).
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Montana’s residents have learned that they cannot preserve
regional benefits in a deregulated environment.  If given the
chance, investor-owned utilities will sell power wherever they can
make the greatest profit.  Although Alaska does not have to worry
that its suppliers will send electricity outside the state, it must
consider the impacts of default supplier and divestiture provisions
within the state.  In particular, Alaska must ask whether it wants to
prevent the divestiture of generation assets if such divestiture
would leave independent wholesalers free to choose to serve only
large industrial users.
D. Adapting the Oregon Plan to Alaska
Alaska may not be ready for complete deregulation.
However, deregulation does not need to be an “either-or”
situation.  Restructuring can take place on different levels, as seen
in the different approaches of the California, Montana, and Oregon
plans.  The Alaska Legislature and the study group CH2M Hill
have both recommended adopting a pilot plan for deregulation.144
The following section outlines some suggestions for adapting the
Oregon plan to Alaska.
1. Portfolio Access.  As previously described, the market
power of aggregated customers supports Alaska adopting a
portfolio access plan with a cost-of-service option.  The cost-of-
service option would keep utilities with excess capacity, like
Chugach and ML&P, from serving industrial customers at low rates
and raising the rates for their residential customers.  A divestiture
provision like Oregon’s would force utilities like Chugach to
maintain their current generation facilities in order to provide
residential customers access to lower-cost power.  Alaska currently
has no renewable resource generation.145  A “green” portfolio
option could be used to gauge demand and encourage the
development of renewable resources, even if such options would
not be immediately available to serve customers.  The market-
based rate would give the legislature insight into the actual costs of
adopting competition on the residential level.
The portfolio plan can respond to customer apathy by
ensuring that customers are not overwhelmed with information
144. See generally CH2M Study, supra note 6.
145. See id. at 1.10 tbl.1.6.  Renewable resources include geothermal, biomass,
wind, solar thermal, and photovoltaic.  Golden Valley and Alaska Wind & Solar
recently constructed a wind demonstration project consisting of a 10 kilowatt wind
turbine placed on an existing tower.  See Healy Wind Study (visited Oct. 4, 1999)
<http://www.gvea.com/Projects/wind.htm>.
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about the electric industry.  Instead of being presented with a large
number of providers or options, residential customers can simply
look at a list of three or four options that their utility has chosen
for them.  By taking away some choice, customers may see less risk
and thus may be more willing to experiment with market prices.
The cost-of-service rate offers protection for customers who do not
want to choose suppliers.  However, the danger of this proposal is
that if customers do not see a clear benefit in choosing a market
option, their failure to choose may prevent the establishment of a
competitive market.146
The portfolio plan cannot prevent smaller providers, like
Golden Valley, from raising residential rates if industrial customers
in Golden Valley’s service area are picked up by a utility with
excess capacity.147  This is a serious drawback to implementing any
type of deregulation in Alaska.  The RCA cannot artificially
manipulate wholesale prices to protect small utilities since FERC
has exclusive jurisdiction over the price of wholesale electricity.148
Any additional restrictions on direct access, such as giving smaller
utilities the choice to opt-out, seem to undermine the goals of
deregulation.  If every utility opts out of direct access except for
ML&P and Chugach, these utilities will find themselves in much
the same place they are today — with excess capacity and no access
to willing buyers.  One approach, suggested in the CH2M Study,
would be to limit contract size and to avoid the current practice of
serving customers on an all-requirements basis.149  If combined with
a mandatory power exchange similar to the one in California, this
proposal could shift the balance between residential and industrial
customers, allowing utilities to bid on market power to supply
portfolio customers at the same prices as are offered to commercial
and industrial customers.150
2. Allowing Small Utilities to Choose Deregulation.  The
Oregon plan allows consumer-owned utilities to make their own
decisions about direct access, but requires reciprocity if the utility
146. See CH2M Study, supra note 6, at 2.7.
147. See Bradner, supra note 132.  Remote villages are probably safe from
cherry picking, but coastal villages in the Railbelt with few industrial customers,
maybe a fish processing plant, and a hospital, are particularly vulnerable.  See id.
148. See supra note 13.
149. See CH2M Study, supra note 6, at 2.5-2.6.
150. Once again, however, the cost of implementing a power exchange in
Alaska could outweigh the benefits, particularly in the short term if the industry is
already struggling with stranded costs and the costs of establishing an ISO.  See id.
at 2.9.
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seeks to serve customers of another utility.151  If instituted, this
provision would grant discretion over deregulation to the majority
of utilities in Alaska.152  Alaska’s current regulatory scheme treats
consumer and investor-owned utilities alike, basing regulation on
revenues rather than ownership.153  Size, or revenue, appears to be
a better category for distinguishing which utilities should have
control over the decision to deregulate, because market power is
such a concern for Alaskans.  To accommodate this concern,
Alaska should keep its current statutory provisions, and order
portfolio access for those utilities that the RCA currently regulates.
Small utilities, whether cooperative or investor-owned, would be
responsible for deciding whether or not to offer their customers
direct access.  For the numerous tiny utilities with purely local
transmission and distribution, deregulation holds little promise in
any case, because it would be cost prohibitive to run transmission
lines to villages simply to allow Railbelt utilities access to a small
number of residential customers.154  Until there are significant
improvements in current facilities and technology, competition is
unlikely to penetrate rural Alaska.
3. Limiting Stranded Costs.  Any implementation of
deregulation in Alaska will have to proceed cautiously.  The threats
of market power concentration and higher costs for residential
customers present significant obstacles.  California’s aggressive
approach to stranded costs has limited market penetration by
energy service providers.155  In California, energy service providers
may temporarily leave the market and return when stranded costs
are paid off and the climate is healthier for their survival.  This will
151. See S.B. 1149 70th Assembly, Reg. Sess. § 24 (Or. 1999).
152. See supra note 67.  Proposed legislation essentially adopts this scheme, but
in a backward manner.  See H.B. 287, 20th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Alaska 1997).
This bill does not require direct access.  Instead, it allows any utility that grants
direct access to its transmission and distribution facilities to request the RCA to
order that it be able to access another utility’s facilities.  See id.  The RCA would
not issue such orders unless the second utility had annual sales of at least 300
million kilowatt hours.  See id.
153. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
154. For this reason, the CH2M Study concluded “[t]here is no restructuring
model in existence today that would work in rural Alaska among the villages and
cities that are not interconnected to the Railbelt System.”  CH2M Study, supra
note 6, at 2.1.  Instead, the study proposes improving local generating systems and
encouraging “technological innovations that could complement or even compete
with the diesel-fired generation systems currently dominating rural electrical
systems.”  Id.
155. See supra note 104.
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not be the case in Alaska.  If a producer in Alaska cannot access
the market, it will go out of business.  Alaska should examine
alternate methods of financing stranded costs, including public
bonds.  It should also discuss adopting an extended time period for
stranded cost recovery to ease the transition into competition and
save small players from bankruptcy.
4. Postponing the Transition to Competition.  Alaska should
consider implementing competition in stages to limit cost and
market impact.156  For example, over the next five to ten years,
Alaska might implement and pay for an ISO and power exchange.
This time period would allow the ISO to become a cost benefit
before further deregulation costs are imposed.  A multiple year
transition time would ensure that the Northern and Southern
Intertie construction could be completed before competition was
imposed, and would give the RCA time to implement technological
improvements to rural systems.  An extended transition period
would also allow utilities that are currently in long-term contracts
to renegotiate those contracts to correspond to a deregulated
market.157  These proactive contract negotiations could substantially
mitigate stranded costs.
Alaska loses little by postponing deregulation, as long as it
establishes a plan and a model for future legislation.  If it does not
adopt a concrete proposal and time-line for deregulation, power
producers will be unwilling to negotiate short-term contracts based
on restructuring.  Postponing the costs of deregulation also
postpones the benefits.  However, these losses seem minimal when
compared to the potential for premature action to injure the
developing market.
156. The CH2M Study calls this “controlled evolution.”  CH2M Study, supra
note 6, at 2.2.
The time sacrificed by taking this longer approach is applied to
developing not just structural mechanisms, but a body of rules that guide
markets toward desired economics and social outcomes.  Regulation is
ultimately supplanted under this scenario by the constant competitive
pressure applied by a diverse range of market entrants with the freedom
and incentives to respond to market opportunities.
Id. at 2.2-2.3.  This approach is contrasted with what the authors call “kilowatt
commoditization,” in which structures are relied upon to regulate the market,
regulators have little oversight, and success or failure turns on underlying market
conditions.  See id. at 2.2.  This approach is most similar to that adopted in
Montana.  See supra notes 106-113 and accompanying text.
157. Long-term contracts would have to be renegotiated to implement either a
power pool or an ISO.  See Black & Veatch Study, supra note 58, at 6-6.
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5. Universal System Benefit Charge.  Alaska is already
struggling with ways to continue its subsidies for low-income
residents.158  Most states that have implemented deregulation place
a universal system benefits charge on utilities based on annual
revenues.159  Implementing a charge like this would place an
additional burden on rates and could even outweigh the limited
benefits of competition.160  Legislators have expressed immediate
opposition to current proposals to establish a universal service fund
created from a direct surcharge on electricity sales.161  Without
some sort of subsidy program, many small village utilities could go
bankrupt.162  More so in Alaska than in any other state, subsidies
are not a question for the electric industry to solve on its own.  If
Alaska wants to protect low-income residents and eliminate a
portion of the price differential between remote villages and the
Railbelt, it must implement some sort of broad-based universal
charge, either on utilities or on customers, and work to develop
technological improvements in village generation, transmission,
and distribution.163
VI.  CONCLUSION
Deregulation provides Alaska with the opportunity to
evaluate its current regulatory scheme.  Inefficiencies in the current
scheme include inadequate transmission, a lack of coordination
among rural villages, and a concentration of generation and surplus
power existing alongside high prices.  Legislators in Alaska must
approach deregulation cautiously, and preserve Alaska’s tradition
of supplying reasonably priced power to all residents.  Before
legislators make any move towards offering direct access to
wholesale power, they should make sure adequate safeguards exist
to protect retail customers from market power problems.  The
benefits to industrial customers should not come at the expense of
158. See supra notes 83-86.
159. See supra note 90.
160. See CH2M Study, supra note 6, at 7.8.
161. See Joling, supra note 57, at D1.
162. See id.
163. The CH2M Study recommends that the legislature “[c]ontinue and expand
efforts to improve rural system efficiencies through aggregation of administrative,
fuel-purchasing, operations, logistical and other appropriate functions among
geographically separate but proximate villages.”  CH2M Study, supra note 6, at
2.12.
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residential customers, particularly those in rural areas already
bearing costs many times higher than urban residents.
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